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Cable television company may exercise eminent
domain
by Judith Gorske
In Cablevision of the Midwest, Inc. v. Gross, 639
N.E.2d 1154 (Ohio 1994), the Ohio supreme court held
that a cable television company is a "communications
business" under state statute, and is therefore entitled to
exercise the statutory power of eminent domain in
erecting its cable lines over private property. The court
further held that state statutes granting the power of
eminent domain to cable television companies were not
preempted by the federal Cable Communications Policy
Act.
Ousted cable television company seeks access to
existing cable
Gary Gross and his brother, Harley, separately own
but jointly manage two residential apartment complexes
in North Royalton, Ohio. Each brother has a beneficial
interest in the properties. The brothers formed a partner-
ship, I. & M. J. Gross Company, to manage the proper-
ties.
In December 1984, Gary Gross granted a cable
television operator, now Cablevision of the Midwest
("Cablevision"), the exclusive right to operate its cable
system on his property in exchange for ten percent of the
subscription income. The contract also provided that, at
the end of the contract term, Gross would own the
underground cables and the cables installed in the walls
of his apartment complex.
On August 26, 1988, I & M. J. Gross Company
contracted with Philips Consumer Electronics Company
("Philips") for the installation of a satellite master
antenna television system ("SMATV") that would
provide cable TV service to the tenants of both proper-
ties. Under this agreement, the wiring and the equipment
installed underground and in walls became the property
of I & M. J. Gross. The company also received a
percentage of the revenues generated by the SMATV. In
exchange, Phillips would be the exclusive provider of
cable services at both properties.
In order to avoid any conflict between this arrange-
ment and the earlier agreement with Cablevision, Gross
sent a letter of cancellation to Cablevision. Cablevision
then brought this action in the Cuyahoga County Court
of Common Pleas, seeking a declaration that
Cablevision was authorized by law to appropriate a
limited interest in the apartment complexes. In effect,
they asked the court to authorize their continued access
to, as opposed to ownership of, the existing cable.
Cablevision based its claim on local ordinances and
local and federal communications statutes.
Trial court holds eminent domain power stems
from municipal grant
The trial court denied Cablevision's motion for
partial summary judgment and granted the Gross'
motion for summary judgment on all issues. Cablevision
appealed. The Eighth Ohio District Court of Appeals
affirmed in part and reversed in part, concluding that
Cablevision was not a "communications business" and
therefore was not included in the local statute that
granted the power of eminent domain to such busi-
nesses. The court also determined that even if the
company were a "communications business," the local
statute would be preempted by the federal Cable
Communications Policy Act of 1984.
Nevertheless, the court of appeals held that
Cablevision had a limited interest in the Gross' property.
In effect, when North Royalton granted Cablevision a
12-year non-exclusive franchise to "construct, operate
and maintain a cable television system in the streets of
North Royalton," they validly delegated their municipal
power of eminent domain to Cablevision.
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Ohio statute labels cable television company a
communications business
The Ohio supreme court first considered whether
Cablevision was a "communications business" under
Ohio's communication statute. The statute provides in
part that "[a]ny company organized at any time to
transact a telegraph, telephone or communications
business may construct.... operate. ... and improve
communications systems for the transmission of voices,
sounds .... signals, pictures, visions .... or other forms
of intelligence, as public utility services, by means of
wire cable ......
The court began by stating that it would enforce the
literal language of the statute even if it resulted in an
unfavorable outcome. The Ohio supreme court then
noted that the statute failed to define "communications
business." The court concluded, however, that the
inclusion of this broad term in the statute suggested a
legislative intent to include forms of communication
beyond the technology available at the time the statute
was enacted. The court noted that "[t]he method of
transmission employed by a cable television system is
expressly mentioned" in the statute. Finally, the Ohio
supreme court analogized the language used to other
sections of the statute that define "cable television
system," noting the similar language in these sections.
Thus, the court concluded that Cablevision was a
communications business entitled to eminent domain
authority.
Federal law prohibits regulation of cable television
systems as a public utility
The court next turned to Section 541(c) of the Cable
Communications Policy Act, which prohibits the
regulation of a cable system as a public utility. The court
considered whether the federal statute preempted state
authority to label a cable television company a "commu-
nications business." The court concluded that treating
Cablevision as a communications business under the
Ohio statute does not violate federal law because the
statute does not require a communications business to be
regulated as a public utility and the federal statute is
aimed at regulation rather than terminology. Accord-
ingly, the Ohio supreme court affirmed the judgment of
the court of appeals.
Dissent argues cable television is not a public
necessity
In his dissent, Justice Pfeifer argued that cable
television companies should not be included in the term
"communications business." He stated that, under
general rules of statutory construction, the examples of
telegraph and telephone companies within the statute
limited the term "communications business" to compa-
nies in the same general class. Justice Pfeifer also urged
that the power of eminent domain ought to be conferred
with special care and limited to items necessary to the
public welfare. Cable television, unlike the telephone, is
not a necessary means of communication. Therefore,
courts should proceed with caution before including
them within a statute that permits property to be taken
from individual owners for the public welfare.
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